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I.   Introduction 
 
Canada has signed three major trade agreements in the past fifteen years, two bilateral 
agreements and one multilateral.  The two major bilaterals are the Canada-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement (CUSTA, 1988) and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA, 1994), while the Uruguay Round Agreement (URA, 1994) under the WTO is 
the multilateral one.  These agreements have been analyzed to ask a variety of questions, 
but in this paper I will focus on what effect these agreements have had on domestic 
policy reform.  The attention is mainly on what has been the Canadian experience, but in 
passing I will note how this compares with what has happened in the U.S.   
 
Trade policy accounts for considerable importance in its own right in Canada, partly due 
to the history and extent of openness of the Canadian economy.  For example, 35 to 40% 
of Canada‘s GDP derives from trade, almost twice as much as in the U.S.  This does give 
trade issues a very high priority internally within Canada.  But, as in most countries, trade 
and domestic policies are not just interdependent but ultimately trade policies are usually 
secondary to domestic policy as one of numerous means to domestic ends. 
 
To examine this relationship we focus on trade policy and reforms in domestic 
agricultural policy in Canada.  We start with a summary of the policy reforms that have 
taken place since the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, examine the agricultural trade 
disputes between Canada and the U.S. that sometimes highlight where reforms have not 
occurred, and try to determine the role of trade agreements, particularly the NAFTA but 
also the WTO Uruguay Round, in those dispute areas, and look at the prospects for 
reform where it has not occurred.  Special attention is given to dairy policy, one of the 
sensitive policy areas where there has been little reform.  Finally, even if the NAFTA has 
not played a large role in policy reform, it could play an important role in resolving the 
trade disputes, indirectly fostering reform.  The thirty trade disputes that have occurred 




II.  Agricultural Policy Reforms in Canada since the CUSTA 
 
The decade of the 1990s marked a significant shift in agricultural policies in Canada.  
Specifically, the sector moved to a substantially less subsidized position and a somewhat 
more open trade environment.  The OECD monitors government support to farmers with 
a measure termed the Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) that is an estimate of the value 
of all financial support and border protection from policies that support agriculture, or the 
transfers farmers receive from taxpayers and consumers due to those policies.   
 
By this measure, most countries have reduced their support to agriculture from a 
benchmark period, 1986-88, to 1999-2001.  However, few countries have reduced their 
support as significantly as has Canada.  As a percentage of total farm receipts, the PSE 
for Canada has fallen from about 34 percent to 18 percent over this thirteen-year period, a 
decline in support of almost one-half (Dewbre and Short).  Although we do not have data   4
for each component of the PSE, most of this decline was due to cuts in government 
subsidy support.  The major component of border protection, the higher domestic prices 
due to quota and tariff protection in the dairy and poultry sectors, has not been changed 
significantly.  Other elements of border protection, outside supply management, have 
declined and in most cases have been removed altogether. 
 
What has come about from this policy change since the mid-late 1980s is a dichotomous 
policy framework.  Eighty percent of agriculture by sales faces modest government 
budget support and little or no border protection.  The remaining part of the sector, dairy 
and poultry production, has remained heavily protected through commodity marketing 
boards with the power to control aggregate supply through domestic and import quotas.  
The actual level of protection in this sector has hardly diminished even since the Uruguay 
Round Agreement, mostly due to the prohibitively high over-Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) 
tariffs and small TRQ levels. 
 
For some years, the structure of Canadian agricultural policy has also changed, moving 
away from traditional support prices or commodity-specific policy in general.  This shift 
was only strengthened by the very substantial mid-1990s reduction in budgetary support 
of the sector noted above.  In terms of subsidies, it can be said that Canada has no 
commodity policy, no direct payments, and no government commodity purchases.  To 
illustrate the importance of these program cuts, the federal government in 1995/96 
removed the grain freight rate subsidy on grain exports from the Prairies region to grain 
terminals such as Vancouver, a cut of about $800 million (Canadian) per year.  It is now 
the case there are no significant export subsidies in Canada, aside from loan guarantees 
on export credit.  In addition, a direct subsidy on milk production was removed over the 
period from 1995 to 2002 that reduced budgetary support by $300 million. 
 
In the place of a commodity focus, federal government expenditure policy has moved 
clearly to the goal of stabilization.   This has taken the form of a pattern of cross-
commodity, insurance-style schemes that focus on aggregate net farm income and crop 
yield stability with a moderate degree of subsidy.  These programs are still evolving as a 
response to a late-1990s combination of low world prices and domestic production 
shortfalls, introducing a greater capacity to cover such farm income “disasters.”  The 
federal government cost of this “risk management” support has also risen to an expected 
$1 billion for 2004, about double the nominal level in the early 1990s. 
 
This modified stabilization policy is one element of a new policy framework that has 
recently been adopted, the Agricultural Policy Framework or APF, which is based on five 
main pillars:  (a) food safety and quality, (b) the environment, (c) science and innovation, 
(d) sectoral renewal, and (e) business risk management (AAFC 2002).  Only in the latter 
category do you have some continuity with earlier emphases on commodity markets.  
This framework is rather different from the previous strategy, entitled Growing Together 
(1989) as is described in Rude and Meilke (2003, p.417):  “Trade, regulatory barriers and 
cost structures are seldom mentioned in the APF.  The focus is more on niche markets, 
branding a unique Canadian product and controlling attributes throughout the food chain, 
rather than on commodity markets… Only in the area of business risk management is   5
there some overlap with … commodity markets.”  Under that category this strategy 
emphasizes “adaptation and innovation, encouraging producers to proactively manage the 
risks facing their farms, whole farm programs, national, stable, predictable, 
comprehensive government programs, and financial sustainability” (p. 416). 
 
This does not cover the budget situation for all government programs.  There is still 
research funding where expenditures have been maintained in real terms, largely through 
federal government programs.  And there are a wide variety of environmental programs 
with components such as protecting water supplies, providing environmental amenities 
like wetlands and areas of biodiversity, and programs to reduce waste water run-off, but 
total budget support is modest.  Against this, extension support under provincial 
government support has fallen substantially.  Input subsidies and programs to invest in 
rural infrastructure have also become rare and modest in funding level. 
 
So agricultural policy in terms of budgetary support has changed quite considerably over 
the last 15 years since CUSTA was adopted.  What remains is much less distortionary in 
terms of effects on agricultural input and output markets, and remaining funding is much 
more decoupled. 
 
However, not all Canadian agricultural policy has been reformed.  There remains the 
supply management policy that covers the dairy and poultry sectors (20 percent of total 
revenue for the agricultural sector).  This policy regime relies upon high levels of border 
protection and farm-level marketing quotas to generate farm-level prices that are well 
above border levels.  The border protection involves a series of tariff rate quotas (TRQs) 
usually at levels of 5-10 percent of domestic consumption, coupled with very high over-
quota tariffs.  These tariffs are in the range of 100-250 percent, but there is much “water” 
in these tariffs.  The result is that these industries are heavily insulated from the operation 
of world markets.  The marketing quotas restrict farm production to a level that roughly 
equals domestic consumption.  In terms of its fundamentals, this system has not changed 
since the mid-1970s. 
 
The supply management system generates very high economic rents.  The value of farm 
level quotas for the dairy industry alone is in the range of $16-22 billion (Canadian), 
which works out to about $1 million per farm, or $20,000 per cow.  Although the poultry 
sector is smaller in aggregate, the per farm quota values are as high as in the dairy sector, 
or higher.  With these values at stake, or in view of the annual income flows that must 
exist to generate these quota values, there are very strong and effective lobbies within this 
sector, defending it against trade policy changes or any changes in its operation.  To say 
this sector is resistant to policy reform is to understate the case.  In terms of its 
fundamentals, this sector has not changed since its inception in the early to mid 1970s.  It 
has weathered all three trade agreements noted, many changes of government, 
widespread public debate, and numerous legal challenges by farmers and others inside 
and outside the system.   
 
The other element of Canadian agricultural policy that has resisted reform efforts is 
another marketing board, the Canadian Wheat Board.  There is no supply control   6
involved here and no significant ongoing government subsidy, but the marketing system 
involves the operation of the Board as a state trading enterprise.  This does not directly 
generate the kind of rents seen in the supply management sector, and the wheat industry 
is competitive on world markets, but there is little transparency in the Wheat Board’s 
operations.  This fuels domestic and international debate about its practices and their 
effects.  It has both an export monopoly as well as a monopsony over purchase of wheats 
and most types of barley.  These powers have increasingly come under domestic debate 
and controversy, particularly from certain groups of farmers affected by the regime.  But 
like the supply management sector, this institution is also quite resistant to reform, 
whether from domestic or international pressure. 
 
 
III.  Apparent Causes of Reform 
 
With the scale of reform in Canada’s agricultural sector, it prompts the question of what 
caused it.  In particular, did it arise from the constraints of trade agreements, and if so, 
was it due to the bilateral NAFTA, or due to the multilateral URA?  If not, what were the 
other pressures that plausibly led to the reforms?   
 
CUSTA/NAFTA Negotiations 
First, we know that the Canadian CUSTA negotiators did not embrace any kind of major 
policy reform options in those negotiations.  They wanted an agreement that would 
reduce tariffs, but not touch the most political non-tariff barriers.  Gifford (2001) make 
this clear and that it was not only a Canadian position:  “…both Canada and the U.S. 
made it crystal clear that they were proceeding on the premise that while their mutual 
objective was to try to eliminate all agricultural tariffs, the most sensitive existing 
quantitative import restrictions would remain.  This in fact is what finally occurred.” (p. 
7).  On the Canadian side, existing import quotas for poultry and dairy products were 
retained, while meat import laws and cereal import licensing arrangements were 
conditionally eliminated.   
 
One could even argue that the CUSTA led Canada to regulate further its dairy industry.  
Some dairy products, namely ice cream and yogurt, were not protected by import barriers 
but depended on tariffs for protection.  Yet the CUSTA was to remove all tariffs, thereby 
leaving these two products open to U.S. competition.  So Canada imposed new import 
quotas for these two products.  Later the U.S. would challenge this action to the GATT, 
the ruling went against Canada, but the issue was not ultimately resolved until the URA 
when all import quotas were tariffied. 
 
In the NAFTA negotiations, Canada adopted a similar stance in its bilateral agreement 
with Mexico.  It was willing to negotiate tariff reductions but once again not negotiate the 
non-tariff barriers on dairy, poultry and eggs.  Canada argued that those issues were 
properly the subject of the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations, which served not to risk 
Canada’s position in those latter negotiations concerning GATT Article 11 which 
permitted import quotas for supply managed commodities. 
   7
This also suggests that Canada was focusing its major policy decisions more upon the 
GATT/WTO negotiations as well, at least as far as Market access issues are concerned.  
All the efforts to preserve supply management policy were placed on the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, as the linch-pin to this objective was to maintain, if not strengthen, GATT 
Article 11.  This effort is also seen in the FTAA negotiations.  Canada has made clear 
that those talks are for tariff reductions only.  Its position is that TRQ levels and over-
TRQ tariffs are a matter for the Doha Development Round (DDR), not the FTAA.  
Similarly, any discussion of the State Trading Enterprises, another sensitive policy area, 
is for the DDR talks. 
 
The U.S. position in its bilateral agreement with Mexico was very different.  In those 
negotiations, the U.S. and Mexico agreed to tariffy all import quotas and phase-out all 
ordinary tariffs and tariff equivalents.  So border protection for all commodities, even the 
most sensitive ones, was to be removed.  The view in Gifford (2001, p. 7) is that this 
decision was the result of the value of market access gained in such an approach, coupled 
with it being easier politically to sell a no-exceptions approach in both Washington and 
Mexico City.  The result, however, was a measure of reform in U.S. agriculture, at least 
to the extent that Mexican competition would provide this. 
 
Before leaving the subject of NAFTA trade negotiations and policy reforms, it should be 
pointed out that there are other subjects than market access.  Gifford notes that Canada 
was willing to make some substantial commitments in the NAFTA that would restrict the 
use of certain policy instruments.  It agreed to forego the use of export subsidies in 
agricultural trade with the U.S.  The NAFTA also pioneered the first SPS agreement that 
was later copied into the Uruguay Round Agreement.  To this extent, the NAFTA 
involved some reform measures for Canada.  But for reform decisions with a significant 
and more immediate financial dimension, Canada did not engage on any such decisions 
within the NAFTA context. 
 
Canada’s 1990s reforms 
In looking at the 1990s reforms in Canadian agriculture, how much of that can be 
attributed to the NAFTA and how much to other causes?  The main features of the reform 
were the reduction of the Crow Rate freight subsidy on export-bound grains, the cutting 
of the dairy direct subsidy, and the cutting of the commodity-focused stabilization 
programs, and the reduction of a variety of smaller subsidies. 
 
There is no question that domestic budget cutting pressures were a primary reason for 
many of the policy changes, particularly the large expensive ones.  Agriculture was not 
singled out in this; substantial cuts were made across the board as part of a federal 
government policy to eliminate its budget deficit.  In turn, provincial governments also 
had to cut their budgets even more substantially, due to the large cuts in federal transfers 
to the provinces. 
 
However, there were other factors at work, even if these were secondary to the budget 
cuts.  The reform of the Crow Rate freight subsidy was influenced to some extent by the 
Uruguay Round Agreement.  On export subsidies, Canada did have a commitment to   8
reduce its declared export subsidies and given the overwhelming importance of the Crow 
Rate subsidy in Canada’s export subsidy list, it had to be reduced.  But the committed 
reduction was no more than 36 percent over 5 years.  Yet Canada decided to eliminate it 
in only two years.   
 
The cuts in the dairy subsidy could be seen as a response to the required cuts in domestic 
support also mandated in the WTO URA.  However, the cut was well beyond the 
minimum required, and the Crow Rate elimination would have satisfied most of the 
domestic support reductions needed.  So this policy decision has also gives the strong 
impression that it was primarily budget cut-induced. 
 
The cuts earlier in the decade in stabilization programs, specifically the National 
Tripartite Stabilization Plan that affected mostly livestock, have a closer relation with 
trade policy.  Here the issue was not a NAFTA provision or a URA commitment.  Rather, 
the issue was trade remedy law, and specifically the countervail provisions.  Given the 
procedures in countervailing duty examinations, Canada was vulnerable to the imposition 
of countervailing duties with the existing design of its stabilization programs.  The shift 
from a commodity based stabilization program to a whole farm, cross-commodity, 
insurance-style program was substantially a response to existing U.S. countervail 
procedures in an effort to design a program that would be immune to countervail charges.  
Such discussions were widely observed in formal government-producer meetings ever 
since the mid-1980s when hogs and pork were subject to a series of countervails, due to 
various Canadian stabilization programs, federal and provincial. 
 
Finally, there are some other reasons that can be advanced to help explain certain policy 
changes.  In the case of the Crow Rate, the policy was increasingly seen to have negative 
effects on a subset of producers, namely those using grains for livestock feeding or other 
value-added activities.  Those hurt by the policy had become sufficiently vocal and 
articulate that the policy was seen as controversial even within the agricultural sector.  
This issue in general may have contributed to some of the policy reforms, namely a 
decline in the coincidence of farm interests, such as along the lines just mentioned, that 
resulted in a greater fragmentation of farm lobbies.  When combined with different 
ideologies and different problems, regionally or by commodity, the previously pressing 
nature of certain agricultural policies was greatly reduced, leaving governments more 
latitude to cut programs without clear and consistent opposition. 
 
 
IV.  Patterns of Trade Disputes:  Selected Illustrations 
 
Another source of evidence of the impact of NAFTA on possible domestic policy reforms 
is to examine recent trade disputes.  This can give some indication of where policy 
reforms have not occurred and may be needed to resolve the disputes.  It also can give 
some measure of whether the NAFTA has any relevance to the dispute such as whether 
dispute resolution measures under the NAFTA have proven to be useful in encouraging 
reforms that would help resolve the dispute.  We will review two important dispute areas,   9
dairy and horticulture to see the nature of the dispute and examine the role of NAFTA in 
comparison to the URA. 
 
Dairy Disputes 
There have been four separate disputes in the dairy sector, the first in 1988 in response to 
the CUSTA, but the latter three occurring in the 1996-2002 period in response to the 
URA.  The first was brought by the U.S. and concerned Canada’s unilateral decision to 
include ice cream and yogurt under import quotas at the beginning of implementation of 
the CUSTA.  They previously had tariff protection and this action was brought to the 
GATT where Canada lost the decision.  This was the example cited above of where 
Canada increased border protection following the signing of the CUSTA.  So far from 
aiding in policy reform, this example illustrates a case of the CUSTA causing a reversal 
of reform.  The dispute was not resolved until the implementation of the URA in 1995. 
 
The second dispute was brought by the U.S. in a complaint that Canada’s tariffication as 
part of the URA implementation contradicted Canada’s obligations under the NAFTA 
where tariffs were to decline to zero over ten years.  The question was which agreement 
had priority, the NAFTA or the URA.  The decision went in Canada’s favour, that URA 
provisions had priority over NAFTA procedures.  So this dispute also involved the 
NAFTA, but because the decision supported the precedence of the URA, it validated the 
very high tariffs in contradiction to the tariff lowering focus of the NAFTA.  Strike 2. 
 
The third dispute arose from a complaint by the U.S. that Canada was not implementing 
its tariff rate quota for fluid milk in accordance with normal import procedures.  This was 
a question of implementing the URA and did not involve NAFTA at all.  The decision 
supported Canada’s unusual method of defining and allocating its fluid milk TRQ, of 
implicitly giving the TRQ to individual cross border shoppers who import small amounts 
of milk on their own, the level of which is determined only by sample surveys. 
 
The fourth dispute lasted five years and was brought by the U.S. and New Zealand in 
1997/98, complaining that Canada was subsidizing its milk product exports.  The claim 
was that Canada was pooling its milk revenues, including domestic production and 
exports, in effect allowing a cross subsidization of the exports, given that the domestic 
price was higher than the export price.  This was upheld by the WTO Panel.  Canada 
modified its export procedures by 2000 to respond to a 1999 decision against Canada, but 
the new arrangement was challenged again.  Another legal iteration occurred 2001, and 
after further questions, revised data calculations and another appeal, a final decision was 
made at the end of 2002, that Canada was subsidizing its exports.  This closed the case, 
and now any exports under a supply management regime with revenue pooling and lower 
export than domestic prices are determined to be subsidized.  Canada had little choice but 
to stop its milk product exports above its 1995 levels. 
 
It should be clear from this overview that the dairy disputes are deep-seated, and brought 
about by a combination of Canadian opportunism in setting up its high over-TRQ tariffs 
and export schemes, and partly due to U.S. suspicions about the supply management 
system.  It illustrates a long-running border dispute that arises from quite different policy   10
institutions and an apparent unwillingness to compromise on both sides.  One complaint 
in this series involved NAFTA, but mostly these disputes centered on GATT/WTO 
issues.  NAFTA dispute resolution procedures made a small contribution but WTO 
panels decided most of the issues.  From all indications, disputes in this sector are likely 
to flare up again, and final resolution is likely to come only from policy harmonization, 
specifically modifying Canada’s levels of TRQs and over-TRQ tariff levels. 
 
Horticultural Disputes 
There have been a series of disputes in this sector as well, including raspberries, Red and 
Golden Delicious apples, greenhouse tomatoes, fresh field tomatoes, whole potatoes, 
yellow onions, sour cherries, iceberg lettuce, cauliflower and tomato paste.  With the 
exception of one case, all have involved either dumping or countervail complaints.   
 
The Red Delicious apples case is very typical of the problems that can arise.  A bumper 
crop occurred in 1989, which resulted in Washington State (and B.C.) producers selling 
at prices below cost, and the B.C. producers being injured.  This met the test of dumping 
and the appropriate duties were levied, although what occurred showed no evidence of 
predatory behaviour by the exporter, and only normal market price cycles at work.  All 
that NAFTA was used for was to challenge the injury determination 5 years later.  The 
case shows weaknesses in existing anti-dumping rules when applied to agriculture, 
especially when the importing country is a “small country” in an international trade 
sense. 
 
The greenhouse tomato case was also a standard dumping complaint.  However, in this 
case the question of like product turned out to be important.  Although the complainant 
argued that like product was only greenhouse tomatoes, the injury investigation 
concluded like product to be all fresh tomatoes, resulting in the case being closed because 
no injury was found.  NAFTA complaints were filed in this case also, asking for a review 
of the US Department of Commerce’s determination of sales at Less Than Fair Value 
(selling below cost).   
 
Most of the dumping and countervail cases are relatively short-lived, due to a temporary 
situation where dumping is found only due to normal industry price cycles or a subsidy 
was found with a poor policy design.  These trade disputes are then due to what could be 
described as normal market frictions.  They are not the serious, long term trade disputes 
that one finds in cases like dairy or wheat where serious domestic policy reform is called 
for.  Although NAFTA has been used to query findings or procedures, such queries have 
not contributed to policy reforms. 
 
Trade dispute data 
When we review the agricultural trade dispute data, we can get another perspective on the 
role of NAFTA in these disputes.  As noted earlier, there are 30 different types of cases 
but 53 specific complaints over the 1988-2003 period.  Of these, 22 disputes have been 
brought before NAFTA, and this occurred during 14 of the 30 cases.  However, as is 
illustrated in the horticulture cases above, most of these (20 out of 22) have involved anti-
dumping or countervail cases.  What is usually being questioned is whether some part of   11
a dumping (AD) or countervail (CVD) case is following improper AD or CVD 
procedures.  These 22 cases have been brought pretty much equally by the two countries:  
9 were brought by the U.S. and 13 were brought by Canada.  Of the 30 cases, only 6 have 
been filed with the WTO.  So this would seem to indicate that although the NAFTA 
appears to be playing a major role in the settlement of disputes, this is true only for the 
relatively minor AD and CVD cases.  This does not involve policy reform in any 
substantial way. 
 
TABLE OF DISPUTES 
 
 
V.  Prospects for Dairy Reform 
 
With its high level of protection and serious trade disputes with the U.S., this sector is a 
major candidate for reform.  What possible resolutions could there be to this area of 
dispute?  The most obvious path to resolution would be for Canada to relax key elements 
of its supply management policy to harmonize the two countries’ dairy policies.  Two 
avenues could be followed, changing over-TRQ tariffs and TRQ levels.  In fact, because 
these are the two critical border policy levers in this industry, an agreement would almost 
certainly require some degree of change in one or the other, or both.   
 
First, Canada could lower its over-TRQ tariffs.  At present they are in the range of 200-
300 percent, but there is a great deal of “water” in those tariffs.  They could probably be 
lowered to around 25-35 percent without resulting in any significant increase in imports.  
It would require a tariff lower than that to move this dispute area toward resolution.  This 
would open the door to imports and would probably meet with some approval by U.S. 
officials.  But they would likely want to see, in addition, a schedule of future tariff cuts in 
order to come to an agreement.   
 
The second avenue would be to give the U.S. greater access to the Canadian market via 
an increase in Canada’s tariff rate quotas for dairy products.  The level of access that 
would be necessary to obtain an agreement is unclear, but it would probably have to be 
significant and also include a schedule of future TRQ increases.   
 
Both options would leave the supply management scheme in place in a mechanical sense, 
but they ultimately would remove most of its benefits.  The tariff reduction route would 
affect domestic milk producers by lowering domestic milk prices once the tariff falls 
below this critical 25-35 percent range.  The level of the value of the Canadian dollar, of 
course, would be an important factor in following this route.  The increase in TRQ levels 
would not result in much change in prices initially but would involve an almost 
equivalent loss of marketing quotas to Canadian farmers.  Both routes would be resisted 
very strongly by the Canadian dairy lobby, and in turn by the Canadian government.  And 
both these routes are likely to be touched on in some way in the current Doha Round of 
multilateral WTO negotiations.  Whatever agreement is struck in the Doha Round will be 
critical to the negotiating options that would be available in any bilateral discussions to 
address these dispute areas.     12
 
If some deal were to be worked out along these lines, it would necessarily involve some 
added elements, especially some that would benefit Canada, because this kind of policy 
change will not be undertaken unilaterally or voluntarily.  These could be benefits to 
other sectors of Canadian agriculture, or benefits outside agriculture.  Another trade 
benefit might be some guarantee of access for the Canadian industry to export into the 
U.S. market without harassment.  These benefits would be easier to arrange in a 
multilateral agreement because so many negotiating options, including threats like denied 
access to a wide-ranging agreement, are on the table.  Although it could be done in a 
bilateral or a regional agreement in principle, it is unlikely in practice because there is 
unlikely to be sufficient benefits to or pressure or leverage on Canada to overcome the 
political costs of changing dairy policy.  We have seen this already in the CUSTA, the 
NAFTA, and now in the ongoing Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations 
where it has been excluded. 
 
A further element of such an agreement might be purely domestic, and that is some direct 
compensation to the Canadian dairy industry.  This could be some kind of direct cash 
benefit on a per farm, per cow or per liter of milk production basis, or it could take the 
form of a government buyout of farmers’ marketing quotas at some agreed-upon price or 
percentage of the market price of quota.   The Canadian dairy industry has already stated 
that if there is to be any dismantling of existing supply management policy, there will 
also have to be major compensation.  There is ample precedent for such compensation 
measures in Canada, most recently with the removal of the Crow Rate subsidy on grain 
freight transportation costs to grain farmers in the Prairies, but also with grape growers 
who were hurt by the change in their effective border protection from the Canada-U.S. 
Free Trade Agreement.  However, as noted earlier, the price tag would range up to the 
current quota value of CDN$16-22 billion, while the Crow Rate buy-out sum did not 
exceed $2 billion. 
 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 
1.  The effect of NAFTA, or its predecessor CUSTA, on domestic agricultural policy 
reform in Canada appears to be minimal.  This seems to be true both during the 
negotiation phase of NAFTA as well as in the post-1988 period when 
CUSTA/NAFTA were being implemented and during which considerable policy 
reform was actually taking place.  The negotiations surrounding these agreements 
were conducted specifically to avoid sensitive non-tariff barriers.  Although tariff 
reductions did involve some adjustments on the part of producers of affected 
products, they did not affect existing policies in a way that required or induced 
reforms.  The CUSTA in one instance actually led to increased protection from 
non-tariff measures.   
2.  On the other hand, the WTO/GATT multilateral agreement (URA) was associated 
much more closely with actual or potential policy reforms in Canada.  The 
negotiations on trade issues that could have had a significant bearing on domestic 
policy reform in Canada took place in the GATT/WTO negotiations (although the   13
results of the negotiations actually involved few major policy changes).  Then 
subsequent to the URA, a number of Canada’s commitments required some kind 
of policy reform, however modest for the most part. 
3.  These observations do not arise because of an absence of policy reform in 
Canada.  Rather, there has been considerable reform of agricultural policies by 
way of substantial cuts in budgetary support to the agricultural sector.  However, 
most of these policy changes have been due to domestic factors, particularly 
federal budget cutting to eliminate budget deficits, rather than due to provisions of 
trade agreements.  Other reform decisions were influenced by URA commitments.  
And outside developments, such as the apparent increase in fragmentation of farm 
lobby groups, may have allowed policy changes that would not have been 
politically feasible in the 1970s and 1980s. 
4.  The U.S. experience has been quite different in comparing the NAFTA with the 
GATT/WTO agreements.  In the U.S. NAFTA bilateral with Mexico, for 
example, all commodities were on the table and some major domestic policy 
changes followed in both countries. 
5.  This difference appears not to be due to philosophical reasons of the merits of 
either type of trade agreement but rather due to opportunistic behaviour by 
countries, depending on the details that differ by cases.  . 
6.  A review of the major bilateral ag trade disputes (between Canada and the U.S.) 
since 1988 supports the contention that the NAFTA has played a secondary role 
in terms of the types of disputes it has been used for.  The overwhelming number 
of disputes (20/22) referred to NAFTA panels have involved some kind of appeal 
of decisions of anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) cases.  By 
contrast, the areas of major bilateral trade policy disputes, where significant 
policy reforms could occur, have mostly been taken to WTO panels for decisions. 
7.  What are the lessons that can be drawn?  In terms of negotiations, it appears that 
whether a country chooses to isolate regional agreements from dealing with 
significant reforms and place the significant issues in multilateral negotiations 
(like Canada) or whether it allows major reform issues to arise in regional 
agreements (like the U.S. and Mexico) depends on the political costs and benefits 
in the case at hand.  There appears to be no country position, philosophy or 
general rules about how to conduct regional as opposed to multilateral talks. 
8.  (a)  In looking at a particular policy area with the potential for major reform in 
Canada, the dairy sector, we see that reform would require increases in input 
quota (TRQ) levels, or decreases in over-TRQ levies.  These changes were 
explicitly excluded from the NAFTA, as areed in 1993, and yet are central 
subjects in WTO negotiations.  There is, however, nothing to prevent these issues 
from being included in a regional agreement.    
(b)  An issue that arises is what would it take to generate reform in this area.  
Clearly there are strong lobby forces to prevent, minimize, or delay policy change 
in this sector, as is the case in all countries’ politically sensitive areas.  Some form 
of compensation is quite likely to be a political pre-condition for such a change.  
Australian experience may be relevant here, although the major Crow Rate 
subsidy removal in Canada is also very relevant. 
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APPENDIX:  Details of Selected Border Dispute Areas 
 
A.1.  Dairy Border Disputes 
 
The dairy industry has a history of being one of the most contentious areas of border relations in 
agriculture between the two countries.  This goes back to the Uruguay Round Agreement which 
was implemented in 1995.  Prior to that time, there were few disputes because dairy policy in 
each country was, by mutual agreement, left unchanged by the NAFTA and the prior CUSTA. 
 
One exception to this pre-1995 peace at the border was the ice cream and yogurt case brought by 
the U.S. against Canada in 1988.  At issue was Canada’s unilateral decision to include ice cream 
and  yogurt on Canada’s import control list, making them subject to import quota restrictions 
instead of being regulated only by tariffs.  The U.S. won this case.  Canada could not unilaterally 
change import quotas into tariffs.  However, Canada’s response came only after the Uruguay 
Round Agreement was signed, by converting these quotas into tariffs, just as it did for all dairy 
products as part of the implementation of the URAA in 1995.  This “reverse tariffication” was not 
done to previous the tariff levels but to considerably higher tariffs, following Canada’s 
interpretation of the Uruguay Round tariffication procedures.   
 
The second dispute concerned this process of tariffication of import restrictions as part of the 
implementation of the URAA, brought by the U.S. against Canada in 1996.  The issue was 
whether the NAFTA or the URA had priority in the setting of tariffs.  They were set as part of the 
URA to replace quantitative import restrictions, but the NAFTA procedure was to reduce all 
tariffs to zero, following a ten-year implementation period.  Also, the new tariffs were higher than 
tariffs agreed to under the NAFTA provisions.  The U.S. argued that the NAFTA required no 
increase in tariffs and conformity with the established time period for tariff reductions, whereas 
Canada argued that the URA had priority and that NAFTA provisions did not apply prospectively 
to any new tariff introductions.  This dispute covered more than dairy products, but also a 
substitute for butter, namely margarine, as well at poultry products that are also part of the supply 
management regime.  The ruling supported the Canadian position, that the URA provision had 
priority over NAFTA procedures and requirements. 
 
The third dispute arose from a complaint brought by the U.S., in 1998, and it dealt with the 
implementation by Canada of the tariff rate quota for fluid milk.  Instead of specifying a quota 
level and giving some trading firm the right to import that quantity of fluid milk, Canada 
implicitly gave this right to individual consumers who were buying fluid milk in the U.S. and 
bringing it into Canada.  The amount of milk actually imported depended on how much 
consumers would choose to bring back, and the quantity imported was calculated by consumer 
responses to a sample survey.  The U.S. took issue with this unconventional procedure and 
brought this dispute to the WTO.  However, the WTO decided in Canada’s favour by accepting 
this procedure for managing the its TRQs. 
 
In late 1997 and early 1998, respectively, the U.S. and New Zealand brought a complaint against 
Canada for subsidizing its milk product exports.  This case, through all its appeals was to run for 
five years and has only recently been settled.  The U.S. and New Zealand argued that some of 
Canada’s categories for pricing industrial milk (the “special milk classes”) created following the 
Uruguay Round involved an export subsidy and that this violated Canada’ commitments under 
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture.  These different categories arise from the practice 
of price discrimination, pricing the raw milk at different levels across products, a practice that is 
not unique to Canada, and most of this industrial milk is sold for domestic consumption.  
However, when these milk products are exported, as they increasingly were during the post-1995   16
period, such pricing practices raised the possibility of an implicit export subsidy.  Export 
subsidies were not banned for agricultural goods in the Uruguay Round, but new ones were and 
Canada did not notify its trading partners that it had any export subsidies on milk products.  The 
price of milk to be paid by processors for these special export classes was below the price of milk 
applied to products consumed domestically, and this constituted the implicit export subsidy.   
 
Although Canada argued that this was not a direct subsidy, neither funded nor paid directly by the 
Government of Canada, and hence not subject to the export subsidy disciplines, the WTO Panel 
and Appellate Body both decided in 1999 that it was a direct export subsidy and that Canada was 
in violation of its commitments.  Canada’s response was to reform its export pricing practices, 
introducing the Commercial Export Mechanism (CEM).  Although the details varied by province, 
this regime involved individual producers contracting directly with processors and not subject to 
the intervention of the national supply management system.  As such, it was expected to be 
WTO-legal.   
 
However, New Zealand and the U.S. challenged this new policy in 2001 with a request for a 
compliance panel, arguing that Canada had maintained its export subsidy by virtue of a cross-
subsidy from higher prices on the domestic market and that the government was still involved in 
orchestrating the scheme.  The WTO Panel in July 2001 supported these contentions and ruled 
that Canada was still subsidizing milk product exports and therefore in violation of its 
commitments.  Canada appealed once more but this time the Appellate Body was unable to make 
a finding because it ruled that the Compliance Panel had used an incorrect price standard to 
analyze whether there was a payment (export subsidy) or not.   
 
In early 2002, the U.S. and New Zealand requested that the compliance panel re-hear the case 
using the more appropriate data.  This time the compliance panel ruled in favour of the U.S. and 
New Zealand, that Canada was continuing to subsidize exports.  Canada appealed and the final 
decision of the Appellate Body was made in December 2002 against Canada.  The substantive 
details of the decision are interesting regarding their economics.  The panel argued that one 
should examine industry average costs, not only production costs for exporting farmers.  Second, 
the panel argued that if export selling costs are lower than calculated production costs then the 
loss must be made up with profits from elsewhere, namely those earned on domestic sales, a 
cross-subsidy.  However goofy this economic reasoning is on both counts, the ruling is final, it 
effectively means any export sales at prices lower than domestic prices will be subject to a charge 
of export subsidies, and Canada must adjust its policies accordingly. 
 
Summary 
Few of the border disputes between the two countries are as deep-seated as is the case in dairy.  
Disagreements have been almost continuous since 1988 and they have been particularly 
acrimonious.  One of the reasons for the extent and nature of these disputes is that Canada erected 
such obviously high barriers in the form of over-TRQ tariffs in excess of 300 percent when the 
URAA was initially implemented, inviting challenges.  Then its milk product exports grew very 
rapidly in percentage terms, partly due to export subsidies through some kinds of revenue 
pooling.  On the other side of the table, the U.S. (and New Zealand) are suspicious of the 
Canadian dairy policy regime which they believe to be open to manipulation in ways contrary to 
WTO disciplines, the common argument lodged against state trading enterprises.  At least as 
important, the U.S. (and New Zealand) believes it has a more efficient dairy industry and that 
Canadian dairy import barriers are costing it large foregone export sales.  Finally, the U.S. 
appears to be persistent in these cases because it sees the Canadian situation as a test case, that if 
left unchallenged the EU would use the same approach and defenses as Canada has, which would 
have the potential to impose larger losses on the U.S.     17
 
With all these factors at work, the U.S. has been persistent in bringing complaints against Canada, 
and the Canadian response has been equally aggressive.  The result is that neither side appears 
interested in any compromise.  It is hard to believe the U.S. will change its attitude to the 
Canadian regime, unless it is dismantled, or change its belief that it can export substantially to 
Canada.  And it is equally hard to believe that the Canadian reaction to these challenges will be 
anything but combative.  This does not auger well for longer term solutions to or compromises in 




A.2.  Canada-US Horticultural Disputes 
 
The horticultural sector is one of the most active areas of trade between Canada and the U.S., 
with this sector accounting for the largest amount of agricultural imports into Canada from the 
U.S.  Canada also is a significant exporter to the U.S. of some horticultural commodities, making 
the two countries competitors in those categories.  This has led to a moderate number of disputes, 
most of which related to claims of unfair subsidization or dumping.    
 
Red Delicious Apples 
One example with large trade flows and reciprocal trade is fresh apples.  There is a long history 
of free trade in commodity but in 1989 there was a claim in Canada that the U.S., specifically 
Washington State, was dumping Red Delicious apples into Canada.  This was a classic case of a 
bumper crop where apple prices in both countries fell substantially.  With normal trade patterns, 
large quantities of apples were exported from Washington to Canada, and transaction prices were 
below normal cost levels.  This met one of the tests for dumping.   In addition, there was no 
question that these trade flows and prices were injuring Canadian apple producers, given the pre-
eminent role of Washington State in Red Delicious apple pricing and that Canada is a price taker 
in this variety.  The result was that this claim was accepted and dumping duties were imposed.  
This occurred in spite of the fact that the both industries were clearly competitive, there was no 
evidence of predatory behaviour on the part of Washington exporters, and “injury” was occurring 
to producers on both sides of the border.  A second such complaint was filed in 1994 by Canada 
and this also resulted in an anti-dumping duty being levied until it was removed in 2000.   
 
Although this case effectively lasted about a decade, it does not reveal a longstanding area of 
dispute.  Rather, the Canadian industry used the situations of large bumper crops 
opportunistically to get “temporary” relief from lower prices by using existing anti-dumping 
legislation.   There have been no further anti-dumping claims in apples.  It does illustrate the 
weakness of applying anti-dumping legislation in the agricultural industry, but that is a broader 
issue and is not unique to Canada-US agricultural trade relations.   
 
Greenhouse and Fresh Field Tomatoes 
Another case in the horticultural industry that is more recent and quite interesting in itself 
occurred in 2001-2002 in the tomato industry.  This example also featured the application of anti-
dumping procedures, but here we have two cases of dumping, one claimed by the U.S. and the 
second by Canada.   
 
The U.S. case occurred first, in mid-2001, and concerned greenhouse tomatoes from Canada 
being exported to the U.S.   One critical area at issue was the definition of  
”like product” and whether the comparable product was only greenhouse tomatoes or the broader 
definition of fresh tomatoes (field and greenhouse).  This was particularly important for the case   18
against Canadian exporters because in the former case Canadian greenhouse tomato exports 
would have a moderate share of the total greenhouse tomato market, thereby being in a position 
to possibly lower market prices by their increased exports.  If the latter definition prevailed, 
greenhouse exports would account for such a small share of the total U.S. fresh tomato market 
that any change in Canadian exports would have no measurable effect on U.S. prices, hence could 
not effectively injure U.S. greenhouse growers.   
 
In the dumping decision, Canadian exporters were found to have dumped their product on the 
U.S. market during the 2000-2001 time period under examination.  However, in the injury 
examination, the like product issue was central.  The ITC final determination decided this using 
the broader definition, fresh tomatoes.  The conclusion that followed was that the dumping of 
Canadian greenhouse tomatoes had not injured U.S. greenhouse growers.   
 
The Canadian case was against fresh field tomato exporters to Canada.  It was lodged in 2001 
several months after the U.S. case was launched against Canadian greenhouse growers, and 
followed a very similar path to the U.S. investigation.  As in the U.S. case, preliminary 
investigations found both dumping and injury to have occurred.  The dumping charge was also 
confirmed in the final determination, but in the case of injury, the Canadian authorities 
determined that the dumping of US fresh tomatoes had not caused material injury.  However, this 
case took an unexpected turn near its conclusion.  The Canadian tomato industry complainants 
withdrew their complaint and request that proceedings on this case be terminated.  This occurred 
two months after the U.S. case had been decided against a dumping charge on Canadian 
greenhouse tomatoes.  It is hard to interpret this result as anything other than indicating that the 
Canadian complaint against the U.S. was a case of tit for tat.  Both cases were closed by these 
decisions and the dispute apparently has ended. 
 
Other horticultural cases 
Almost all of the other horticultural cases over the last two decades for which we have data have 
involved anti-dumping, like tomatoes above, or countervails.  An exception would be the closing 
of the U.S. border to PEI potatoes due to an SPS problem.   
 
One of the earliest cases was raspberries which was initially filed in 1984 by the U.S. for both 
countervailing and anti-dumping duties.  There was a provincial subsidy program in effect in 
British Columbia at the time, in the amber box by today’s standards, and the preliminary finding 
was in the affirmative.  However, that case was suspended without a final determination.  The 
anti-dumping case was decided with an affirmative ruling and dumping duties were in force until 
1999.  A longer term impact was that many of these provincial subsidy programs were ended or 
modified so as not to trigger countervails. 
 
Anti-dumping cases involving whole potatoes, yellow onions, sour cherries, and iceberg lettuce 
were brought by Canadian producers against the U.S. between 1984 and 1992, and all resulted in 
anti-dumping duties being levied for an average of ten years.  Two other cases, concerning 
cauliflower and tomato paste were brought in the 1992-93 period, again by Canada, but denied on 
the basis of a negative injury determination.   
 
Conclusion 
The horticultural sector has seen a variety of border disputes over the past 20 years, but most have 
been relatively short-lived, and have involved types of fruits and vegetables where the two 
countries are producing competitively.  Further, they have mostly involved dumping or 
countervail actions.  Canada has initiated the majority of the cases, almost all of which were 
dumping complaints and which were initiated in the mid-1980s to early 1990s.  The timing of   19
these cases suggests that the exchange rate has played a role.  The number of Canada-initiated 
horticultural cases peaked at about the same time as the value of the Canadian dollar did so, and 
conversely since the mid-1990s when the Canadian dollar depreciated in value.  In some of these 
cases a result has been a change in marketing practices or government policies to remove the 
offending actions.  None of the cases have developed into ongoing or serious conflicts as has 
been the case in wheat and dairy.  
 
Are there any lessons that can be learned to alleviate these conflicts?  The most obvious issue is 
that prevailing anti-dumping legislation is pre-disposed to affirmative findings when applied to 
the agricultural sector.  It is in need of reform, but this is a wider issue than bilateral Canada-US 
trade.  Still, some tightening up of anti-dumping provisions at least when applied to the 
agricultural sector would be appropriate; this may be a fruitful topic for bilateral (or trilateral) 
discussions in the context of NAFTA.  There may be few other lessons.  With the wider use of 
countervail and antidumping in the last two decades, countries and industries are modifying 
policies and marketing strategies, respectively, to minimize these types of trade restrictions (and 




A.3.  Corn Dispute
1  
 
This case concerns a rather small market in Canada, the corn market in the Prairies, centered on 
Manitoba.  In this case, Manitoba corn growers filed both anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
actions against U.S. corn imports in August 2000.  It is an interesting case in that it shows how a 
neighbouring market can be affected by the subsidies of the U.S. farm program.  It also shows 
what can happen when farmers in such a regional market can try to deal with the price depressing 
effects of those subsidies using trade remedy laws, namely anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
procedures.  It is unique in that it involved “regional” rules of inquiry and injury rather than the 
more usual national rules.   
 
What precipitated the case was the relatively high level of subsidy support granted to US corn 
growers, resulting in depressed corn prices on the Canadian prairies.  In this market like so many 
in Canada and U.S. agricultural economies, the two markets are highly integrated so that price 
transmission is not only rapid but price levels are almost completely equalized.  One might think 
of this case as an attempt by Canadian corn growers to use trade remedy law in Canada to deal 
with the negative price effects in Canada arising from existing high levels of US subsidies. 
 
The findings in this case were positive determinations of subsidy and dumping at an unusually 
high level, with duties first applied in November 2000.  The combined duty in the final 
determination was US$1.30 per bushel when market prices at the time were US$1.80.  However, 
the injury test was concluded negatively in the final determination in March 2001.  Part of the 
reason for this is that “regional” standards were applied which required not just that material 
injury was caused but that injury was found “to all or almost all producers” in the prairie region, 
interpreted to mean 95 percent.  This is relevant because a sizeable minority of corn-growing 
farmers were involved in a mixed livestock-wheat enterprise in which case lower corn prices 
would not have injured their operations (at least not to the same extent).  The other reason for the 
                                                 
1 This section draws heavily on a paper that deals with this case in some detail, R.M.A. Loyns, “Manitoba 
Corn Growers Asssociation Inc. vs. U.S. Corn Exports,” in Loyns, Mielke, and Knutson, Trade Remedy 
Laws and Canada-U.S. Trade Relations, Winnipeg, MB:  Friesen Press, 2003.   20
finding of non-injury is that rigid legal or administrative definitions were used, notably ignoring 
opportunity costs, as is common in applications of trade remedy law.   
 
The conclusions that arise from this case are first that the use of trade remedy law, such as 
countervails, to deal with high levels of domestic support in a trading partner where markets are 
relatively integrated, are not likely to be successful, especially not in a regional setting.  Further, 
the thresholds for judging injury in a regional, not national, setting, at least as interpreted in 
Canada, make it almost impossible to find injury.  Third, trade remedy law as widely practiced is 
applied with so little attention to economic logic that its utility as a policy tool can be severely 
questioned.  This is not news to anyone reviewing the litany of trade disputes between Canada 
and the U.S., only that it is illustrated quite clearly in this specific case. 
 
 
A.4.  Hogs/Pork Disputes 
 
There have been a number of trade disputes affecting the hog and pork industry, almost all 
countervail cases initiated by the U.S.  They began in 1985 with a countervail duty investigation 
brought by the U.S. against Canadian hogs and pork.  It may not be an exaggeration to say that 
this was the dominant agricultural trade dispute between the two countries in the 1980s.  It was 
initiated because of the belief that Canadian hog stabilization programs, federal and provincial, 
were increasing Canadian exports of hogs and pork to the U.S., and that this increased supply on 
the U.S. market depressed prices there sufficiently to injure U.S. producers.  The result was an 
affirmative finding both for the subsidy and injury to U.S. producers, and a countervailing duty 
imposition of Cdn$0.044/lb live weight on live swine. 
 
Out of this initial dispute came almost a decade of appeals, extraordinary challenges, follow-up 
cases on subcategories of fresh, chilled and frozen pork, and numerous reviews of countervailing 
duty calculations and determinations of injury.  The hog dispute was one of the first to utilize the 
binational panel review provisions introduced in the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and 
continued in the NAFTA.  Some of the duties (fresh, chilled and frozen pork) were revoked in 
1991 but others (live swine) remained until a sunset review revoked the last of them in 1999. 
 
These cases brought about other important results.  First, Canadian stabilization programs were 
modified over the late 1980s and 1990s, specifically to reduce the risk of countervail, and the 
program for hogs, the National Tripartite Stabilization Program, was eliminated in 1994.  The 
cost of the countervailing duties was in effect taxing away all the benefits of these stabilization 
programs anyway (Cluff et al).  Another result was a series of studies to examine how much these 
programs could have affected the U.S. price, hence injury to U.S. producers.  The consensus of 
these studies was that the increased Canadian production due to the stabilization programs would 
have had an insignificant effect on U.S. hog prices, even if all the production increase were 
exported to the U.S. (Schmitz et al, 2003).  Consequently, injury to US producers was minimal or 
nonexistent; the real explanation for declines in U.S. hog prices lay elsewhere. 
 
A.5.  Wine Dispute 
 
Another area of dispute between Canada and the U.S. in the 1980s was wine.  This dispute arose 
from the practice in Canada of provincial liquor boards charging a wholesale/retail markup that 
differed between domestic and imported wine.  This violated the national treatment article of the 
GATT and constituted the basis for the dispute.  In fact, the European Union was also concerned 
by this practice and was threatening to take this dispute to the GATT to obtain some resolution.   
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However, this was handled within the (1986-87) negotiations of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement. The practice of applying differential markups on U.S. wines was ended as part of this 
agreement.  Of course, this meant higher markups for domestic wines, with the obvious 
implication of a resulting lower price for domestic grapes.  The domestic grape industry was 
widely publicized as a casualty of the Free Trade Agreement.  This potential political problem 
within Canada was dealt with by a simple application of the compensation principle.  Grape 
growers who would remove old (low quality) grape varieties and replace them with higher quality 
new plantings would receive a substantial subsidy payment per acre replanted, roughly 
Cdn$8,000 per acre.  The size of this payment can be judged by comparing it to price of the grape 
land itself, which was roughly $8000/acre also.  It was a popular program and effectively 
removed any criticism from grape growing areas about negative impacts of the Free Trade 
Agreement.  This may have little direct relevance to trade disputes with the U.S. but it does show 
how one can deal effectively with the political downside of dealing with a dispute that imposes 
costs on domestic producers. 
 
 
 
 